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The resilience of real-world complex networks, such as Internet, electrical power grids, 31 airline routes, ecological and biological networks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ] to "node failure" (i.e. node 32 malfunctioning or removal) is a topic of fundamental importance for both theoretical and 33 applied network science. Node failure can cause the fragmentation of the network, which 34 has consequences in terms of system performance, properties, and architecture, such as 35 transportation properties, information delivery efficiency and the reachability of network 36 components (i.e. ability to go from node of the network to another) [3] . 37
Several studies [3, 7, 8, 9] have investigated the resilience of model networks using a 38 number of "attack strategies", i.e. a sequence of node removal according to certain 39 properties of the nodes [2, 3, 7] . A widely-applied attack strategy consists in first ranking 40 the nodes with respect to an importance criterion (e.g. number of connections or some 41 measures of centrality) and then remove the nodes sequentially from the most to the least 42 important according to the chosen criterion until the network either becomes disconnected 43 or loses some essential qualities [3, 10] . However, little is known on how the efficiency (i.e. 44 fraction of nodes to be deleted for a given change in the network) of attack strategies 45 varies when considering differing real-world and model networks. 46
In addition, an interesting -although underappreciated -issue is how the relative 47 Several indexes and measures have been introduced to describe network damage. In this 76 work, we use the size of the largest connected component (LCC), i.e. the size of the largest 77 connected sub-graph in the network [2, 3] , as a measure of network damage during the 78 attack. A faster decrease in the size of the LCC indicates a more efficient attack strategy. In 79 order to compare attack strategies across networks, we used the normalized LCC size with 80 respect to the starting LCC size, i.e. the number of nodes in the LCC before any removal. 81
For each attack strategy, we applied both the recalculated and non-recalculated methods. 82
In the recalculated method, the property of the node relevant for the attack strategy (e.g. 83 number of links) was recalculated after each node removal. In the non-recalculated 84 method, the property of the node was computed before the first node removal and was 85 not updated during the sequential deletion of nodes. An attack strategy is less efficient 86 than another when a higher the fraction of nodes has to be removed to reduce the LCC to 87 zero (or any other size). With q we indicate the fraction of nodes removed during the 88 sequential removal of nodes. 89
We used 2 attack strategies that have been already described in the literature. For all attack nodes were sequentially removed from most to least connected, or in case of 103
Bet, from higher to lower betweenness centrality. 104
Networks 105
We tested the attack strategies described in Section 2. added to the network. The probability  that the new node will be connected to node i 136 already in the network is function of the degree ki of node i, such that
preferential attachment, since more connected nodes are more likely to be connected to the 138 new node) [2] . The BA network is defined by parameters N and m, i.e.
BA(N,m). We built 139
BA scale free networks with parameters BA(N=500, m = 2), BA(1 000, 2), BA(10 000, 2). 140
is the proportion of nodes in the 143 network having degree k. The maximum node degree kmax is equal to N, where N is the 144 number of nodes. The domain of the discrete function P(k) becomes (1, kmax). We generated 145 the degree sequence of the nodes by randomly drawing N values k1,…,kn from the degree 146 distribution. Then, for each node i we drew a link with node j with probability P(ki)P(kj.) A 147 scale free configuration model network is defined by parameters N, α and <k>. We 148 analyzed scale free network with parameters CM(N = 500, α = 2.5, <k> = 3.8), CM(1 149 000,2.5,3.8), CM(10 000,2.5,3.9). 150
Real world networks 151
We tested the attack strategies on the following real-world networks: (i) The Gnutella P2P 152 
Real-world networks (Fig. 2) 174
Email: Bet was the most efficient strategy to reduce LCC up to q~= 0.3. For greater 175 fractions of nodes removed, First and Comb were slightly more efficient than Bet. 176
Immuno: Bet was distinctly more efficient than other strategies up to q = 0.55. For q > 0.55, 177 all strategies were equally efficient. 178
Gnutella: Bet was the most efficient attack strategy. 179
Recalculated 180
3.2.1 Model networks (Fig. 3 (Fig. 4)  190 Email: All attack strategies were equally efficient up to q = 0.12. For q > 0.12 Bet was the 191 most efficient attack strategy. 192
Immuno: Bet was largely the most efficient attack strategy. For model networks, the efficiency of the attack strategies depended on network topology. 214
In the case of networks with power-law degree distribution, the efficiency of the attack 215 strategies depended also on network size. Across all model networks and considering both 216 the non-recalculated and recalculated methods, attack strategies based on either the 217 betweenness centrality of nodes or node rank were the most efficient ones. However, the 218 sequential deletion of nodes according to their betweenness centrality was consistently the 219 most efficient attack strategy to real-world networks, with the only exception of the attack 220 to the Email network with the non-recalculated method. While in some cases Bet was 221 slightly more efficient than other strategies in reducing the size of the largest connected 222 component, in others Bet was largely the most efficient strategy. For example, in the 223 immunoglobulin interaction network, deleting a very small fraction of nodes with high 224 betweenness centrality reduced the size of the normalized LCC of more than 60% using 225 either the recalculated and non-recalculated method, while for the same fractions of nodes 226 removed other attack strategies were able to obtain only a 1-5% reduction in LCC size. 227
Betweenness centrality describes how "central" a node is in the network by considering 228 the fraction of shortest paths that pass through that node [17] . Nodes with betweenness 229 centrality greater than 0 play a major role in connecting areas of the network that would 230 otherwise be either sparsely connected or disconnected [23] . This makes betweenness 231 centrality an important centrality measure for a social, technological, computer, and 232 biological networks. The higher efficiency of the strategy based on node betweenness 233 centrality with respect to the attack based on node rank in real-world networks can be 234 explained by the fact that in real-world networks some of the critical nodes (i.e. nodes 235 whose persistence strongly contribute to maintaining network integrity) are either not 236 highly linked, or that the highly linked nodes are not located in the network core [23] . 237
The newly-introduced Combined attack strategy, when recalculated, was the most efficient 238 strategy to decrease LCC size in the scale free network configuration model and in the 239 Barabasi-Albert model up to q = 0.1, performing slightly better than the attack based on 240 node rank (First strategy). The Combined attack first select nodes according to their rank, 241 then, in the case of ties (i.e. nodes with the same rank), it sequentially removes nodes 242 according to their second degree. On the contrary, in the case of ties First randomly 243 chooses the removal sequence for the nodes with the same rank. Thus, at the beginning of 244 the attack to the network, when two or more major hubs have the same number of links to 245 other nodes, selecting to remove first the hub with the greatest second degree causes a 246 faster decrease in LCC size than to randomly select the removal sequence for those hubs. 247
Later in the attack, the Combined strategy was less efficient than the First strategy to attack 248 scale free networks; this might be due to the fact that after a certain fraction of hubs has 249 been deleted, removing first (in the case of ties) the node(s) with the highest second 
